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Governing the commons : the evolution of institutions for collective action

Author: Elinor Ostrom
Publisher: Cambridge, England : Cambridge University Press, 2015. 2015
Series: Political economy of institutions and decisions.
Edition/Format:   eBook : Document : English : Canto classics editionView all editions and formats
Summary:
The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides  Read more...
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Genre/Form: Electronic books
Case studies
Additional Physical Format: Print version:
Ostrom, Elinor.
Governing the commons : the evolution of institutions for collective action.
Cambridge, England : Cambridge University Press, ©2015
xvi, 280 pages
Material Type: Document
Document Type: Book, Computer File
All Authors / Contributors: Elinor Ostrom
ISBN: 9781316457764 1316457761
OCLC Number: 966312330
Awards: Nobel Prize, 2009.
Description: 1 online resource (298 pages) : illustrations.
Contents: Series editors' preface --
Preface --
Reflections on the commons --
An institutional approach to the study of self-organization and self-governance in CPR situations --
Analyzing long-enduring, self-organized, and self-governed CPRs --
Analyzing institutional change --
Analyzing institutional failures and fragilities --
A framework for analysis of self-organizing and self-governing CPRs --
Notes --
References --
Index.
Series Title: Political economy of institutions and decisions.
Responsibility: Elinor Ostrom.

Abstract:

The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr. Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways--both successful and unsuccessful--of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
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